The great irony of the current U.S. administrations’ doublespeak is often that it can be so inaccurate but so right at the same time. There was no lack of such speech during the recent hearings before the Congressional Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees where General David Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker pressed for a continued occupation of Iraq at current troop levels. In the sea of empty rhetoric from all sides, Crocker spoke of Iranian intentions of “Lebanonization” of Iraq. His words remind exactly why, as both Crocker and Petraeus repeated, supposed gains in Iraq are “fragile and unstable” - and why they will remain so as long as the U.S. continues its military and political occupation.
The statement which brought “Lebanonization” to the table, like many of the comments by Crocker, was historically inaccurate: “Iran is pursuing, as it were, a 'Lebanonization' strategy, using the same techniques they used in Lebanon, to co-opt elements of the local Shi'a community and use them as basically instruments of Iranian force,” he said.
Ignoring the fact that Hezba’llah cannot be seen as a mere tool of Iran, the comments do prompt a real reminder of what “Lebanonization” means and just how “fragile and unstable” Iraq becomes each day. In its commonly-held meaning, that Crocker surely must have been aware of, “Lebanonization” occurred when the Arab country of Lebanon entered a civil war led by internationally-backed feudal warlords and their militias claiming to represent sectarian and political groups.
Iraq fits this surface-level description all too well. Beyond this, though, the U.S. is literally architecting the deeper, more dangerous structural problems and militarization that fracture Lebanon to this day in playing a role similar to Syria and Israel in Lebanon.
If anything, Crocker and Petraeus’ speeches sounded like something directly out of the Syrian and Israeli spin machines during and post the Lebanese civil war. The U.S., like Syria, is all of a sudden the only thing that can stop Iraqis from killing themselves, done so by installing itself in the middle of the game and selectively arming groups. The U.S., like Syria, continues to shift its alliances according to its need and finds a new enemy every few months. For the Syrians in Lebanon, the enemy was one day the Palestinians and the next day the Israelis, one day one Shi’ite militia and the next one Christian one; for the U.S., yesterday it was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and today Iran. U.S. hands are in every nook of the Iraqi democratic process, ensuring that only the most friendly to the U.S. make it to the government. There is even the standard Syrian and Israeli practice in Lebanon of torturing prisoners.
In the meanwhile, the presence of the U.S., like the presence of the Israelis in South Lebanon or the Syrians in Lebanon’s center, does nothing more than justify the existence of militias who claim they must protect their country. The Jaish-al-Mahdi in Iraq can claim its stake because it is fighting an occupation; this the current motivation behind the clashes in Sadr City that just yesterday killed 3 and has the U.S. army dressing up as Iraqi security to protect itself. Take away the impetus for these groups and you have a very different situation; as Hezba’llah learned, once the occupier flees armed groups must reshape their role to one of civil politics and have little legitimacy in keeping weapons.
“Lebanonization” also offers clarification of the many supposed successes Petraeus offered Congress on his many charts. The drop in inter-sectarian incidents is quite easily explained in the fact that Baghdad – and the country itself- is becoming a land of walls controlled by local militants. Internal displacement in Baghdad has risen dramatically as over five years of forced segregation becomes cemented, and the prospect of inter-sectarian violence has decreased as Shi’ite, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians, and the political groups-within-these-groups, interact with less frequency. Beirut, like in Baghdad was carved as such, with violence occurring in the same way, mostly on the dividing lines of the city’s sectarian quarters or in dramatic massacres and car bombs.
Lebanon also offers a quite important warning regarding the Sons of Iraq, the quasi-volunteer unit Petraeus touted, which is paid stipends around $10 a day to help defend neighborhoods against AQI, stipends. This barely-compensated group in a fractured society may prove already-armed membership for militias, as the underpaid Lebanese military did when it collapsed in the first days of the war.
This Lebanon-style militia-ization is being codified with efforts by the main U.S. allies in Iraq, such as the Supreme Council of Iraq, who want to capitalize on a federalist-type law that goes into effect this month. This law allows regions to apply for special status similar to that accorded the Kurdish region, giving the local government the right to establish local paramilitary forces and to negotiate deals with foreign oil companies. It now offers the potential for each political faction to arm and fund itself in a state-sanctioned way.
Irrationally removing a central government in weeks, the U.S. replaced it with a political system mirroring Lebanon’s. This very structure in Lebanon is the chief structural cause of sectarianism in Lebanon and continues to be the impetus for deadlock. U.S. actions during the sanctions and its destructive invasion have proved a boon for an underground economy feeding civil war. As in Lebanon, paramilitaries are using the black market to fund their armory and hold down their fiefs; they tax entry into cities and parts of Baghdad and own the channels of external and internal trade.
Crocker was right: “Lebanonization” is occurring and Iraq is “fragile and “unstable.” But the U.S. itself is as an architect and impetus for both these realities. The Democratic Congressmembers could easily have pressed this point, instead of speaking of vague Iraqi responsibility, had they remotely examined the facts of the ground. Instead, political grandstanding took over, another opportunity for change was lost, and the administration gained another green light to speed forward civil war in Iraq.
